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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of individual bank fundamental variables on 
stock market returns using data from a panel of 235 European banks from 1991 
to 2005. The sample period marks a significant transition in the European bank-
ing sector, characterized by higher competition, lower profit margins in the tra-
ditional interest-related business and increasing non-interest income in terms of 
fees and commissions. In panel regressions, we relate bank stock returns to fun-
damental accounting information and use several corrections for the standard er-
rors to control for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and spatial correlation. Our 
results indicate that several bank-specific variables exhibit a robust explanatory 
power across different model specifications. Most important, there is a positive 
impact of the ratio of loans to total assets, the ratio of non-interest income to to-
tal income, and the ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets on subsequent 
bank stock returns. In contrast, the ratio of loan-loss-provisions to net interest 
revenue and the ratio of book value of equity to total assets load negatively on 
subsequent bank stock returns. Overall, the valuation of bank stocks incorpo-
rates both the traditional loan-related side of the banking business and the grow-
ing off-balance activities. 
 
 Keywords: Asset pricing, bank stock returns, bank-specific accounting ratios. 
 
 JEL Classifications: C14, G12, G14, G21. 
 
 
 
 
 
a Wolfgang Drobetz, Institute of Finance, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg, 
Germany, Phone: +49-40-42838-5506, Mail: wolfgang.drobetz@wiso.uni-hamburg.de. 
b Thomas Erdmann, Credit Suisse Group, Gartenstrasse 14, 8002 Zurich, Switzerland, Phone: +41-44-
3331946, Mail: thomas.erdmann@credit-suisse.com. 
c Heinz Zimmermann, Department of Finance, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum (WWZ), Uni-
versity of Basel, Switzerland, Phone: +41-61-2673312, Mail: heinz.zimmermann@unibas.ch. 
d We thank McKinsey & Company (Zurich office), especially Thomas Wirth and his team, and Bureau 
von Dijk for generously providing access to their databases and many helpful comments. 
2 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the impact of individual bank fundamental variables on stock market 
returns using data from a panel covering more than 200 listed and delisted European banks 
over the time period 1991 to 2005. Financial institutions are mostly excluded from asset pric-
ing tests because of their high leverage and the high level of industry regulation due to the 
negative externalities that might arise from potential bank difficulties (e.g., Fama and French, 
1992).1 However, because of the special nature of financial institutions in Continental Europe 
arising from the strong interdependence between banks and the non-financial sector, which is 
a typical characteristic of bank-based financial systems, important links might exist between 
bank-specific attributes and the cross-section of bank stock returns. 
The financial system in Continental European countries has experienced significant changes 
during the recent years (e.g., Schmidt, 2004). In particular, the time span of our study covers a 
significant transition period in the European banking industry characterized by a strong in-
crease in competition, lower margins in the traditional interest-related banking business, and 
increasing non-interest income in terms of fees and commissions. The most important forces 
driving these developments have been the harmonisation of the regulatory framework, the 
launch of the European Union Single Market in 1998 as well as the introduction of a single 
European currency in 1999, and the emergence of cross-border mergers, leading to strong ac-
quisition and consolidation activities within the European financial sector. In general, compe-
tition in the European banking industry has increased sharply due to the market entrance of 
global competitors and institutional investors. In this process, the share of earnings from asset 
management, securities and derivatives trading, and investment banking activities drastically 
increased over the past years, whereas the classical interest margin business diminished (e.g., 
Goddard et al., 2001; Schure et al., 2004). In this paper, therefore, we estimate and compare 
the impact of fundamental variables from traditional and non-traditional financial intermedia-
tion activities on bank profitability, as measured by stock returns subsequent to the release of 
relevant accounting figures. For example, the fundamental variables include the ratio of loans 
to total assets or loan-loss provisions to net interest revenue. In addition, we include tradi-
tional asset pricing factors (e.g., the book-to-market ratio) into our model. This approach is in 
contrast to numerous studies that explore the influence of macroeconomic developments on 
banks’ operations and performance but neglect bank-specific variables (e.g., Choi et al., 1992; 
                                                 
1 Exceptions are Barber and Lyon (1997) as well as Petkova (2006), who document that the standard fundamen-
tal factors (e.g., the book-to-market ratio) exhibit explanatory power for a cross-section of bank stock returns. 
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Bessler and Booth, 1994; Oertmann et al. 2000; Bessler and Murtagh, 2004). With respect to 
the econometric methodology, we run panel regressions and apply alternative corrections for 
the estimated standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and spatial cor-
relation (firm effects) that are present in our data. 
Some of our empirical results are in contrast to previous studies. For example, Leledakis and 
Staikouras (2004) also look at a panel of European banks from 1997 to 2004, but their results 
indicate that only the book to market ratio and the loan quality are important in explaining the 
cross-section of bank stock returns. Using a large sample of US banks from 1986 to 1999, 
Cooper et al. (2003) observe that the changes in the share of non-interest income and the 
changes in financial leverage are relevant predictors for the cross-section of stock returns.2 A 
crucial question in asset pricing is whether their results obtained for the US stock market can 
be generalized to European markets. In contrast to the results in Leledakis and Staikouras 
(2004), we identify several fundamental variables which have explanatory power for the 
cross-section of European bank stock returns. However, in several instances the direction of 
their influence on subsequent stock returns is different from the US findings in Cooper et al. 
(2003). There is a positive impact of the ratio of loans to total assets, the ratio of non-interest 
income to total operating income, and the ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets on 
subsequent stock returns. In contrast, the ratio of loan-loss-provisions to net interest revenue 
and the ratio book value of equity to total assets ratio both load negatively on subsequent 
stock returns. These results suggest that the valuation of bank stocks incorporates both the 
classical loan-related side of banking activities and the growing off-balance activities. The 
major findings are robust for different estimation periods and assumptions regarding the 
length of the impact of accounting information. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model setup and 
provides a general discussion of the bank-specific fundamental variables we use in our asset 
pricing tests. Section 3 continues with a data description and explains our methodology to 
construct time series of accounting variables with changing accounting standards. Section 4 
starts with a discussion of estimation efficiency in alternative panel regression models, shows 
our main estimation results, and provides results of robustness tests with respect to the timing 
                                                 
2 Other studies that investigate the impact of fundamental bank-specific variables on bank performance are Bec-
calli et al. (2006), who report a positive relationship between efficiency as measured by input-output models and 
value creation, or Saunders and Schuhmacher (2000), who focus on interest rate margins. Other papers investi-
gate the concentration process and the impact on competition in the banking sector (e.g., Staikouras and Kout-
somanoli-Fillipaki, 2006). 
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of accounting information and the length of the impact of accounting information. Finally, 
section 5 summarizes our results. 
2. Fundamental variables and data analysis 
2.1. Measurement and timing of bank performance 
Ball and Brown (1968) were the first to analyze the empirical relationship between account-
ing information and capital markets. By facilitating prediction of a firm’s future cash flow and 
helping investors to assess the risk-return characteristics of a security, accounting information 
will supposedly provide investors with relevant information for their investment decisions. 
While market efficiency in its semi-strong form implies that information will be priced in-
stantly as soon as is it published, a growing strand of the empirical literature provides evi-
dence for a relationship between stock returns and accounting measures. In contrast to the 
classical event study approach, these studies analyse the relationship between stock returns 
and accounting numbers over a longer period of time. While event studies posit a causal con-
nection between accounting figures and stock returns, long-run performance studies do not 
assume that market participants use accounting data in their valuation process. Nevertheless, 
if accounting data are good summary measures of the events incorporated in security prices, 
they will be value relevant because their use might provide a value of the firm that is close to 
its market value.3 
This study investigates the role of specific fundamental accounting variables in explaining the 
cross-section of expected bank stock returns in Europe. To capture the heterogeneity of banks, 
we use a set of bank-specific variables that reflect differences in a bank’s risk exposure and its 
production function as the independent variables. In a banking context, however, numerous 
performance measures other than total shareholder return have been suggested, such as differ-
ent versions of residual income measures and Economic Value Added (EVA) concepts, more 
banking specific measures like return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), return on risk 
adjusted capital (RORAC), as well as interest (or intermediation) margins.4 Compared to the-
se alternative performance measures, the total stock return is independent of accounting rules, 
requires no further assumptions (e.g., the cost of capital for EVA), is available on a short-term 
basis, and measures the actual value creation from the investor’s standpoint. In addition, using 
accounting measures as dependent variables, such as ROE or ROA, will only reveal the me-
                                                 
3 Dumontier and Raffournier (2002) provide a survey of related studies with European data. 
4 See Fiordelisi et al. (2005) for a discussion of shareholder value measures in the banking context. 
5 
chanics of bank accounting rather than value generation.5 Margin-based measures are also 
ruled out as a performance measure because they are used as explanatory variables in our re-
gressions. Moreover, one hypothesis is that traditional margin-based activities loose impor-
tance and, hence, they might not be sufficient to fully capture bank performance. Therefore, 
we use total monthly bank stock returns in excess of the risk free interest rate as the depend-
ent variable in our regressions.6 The risk free interest rate is proxied by the one-month Euro 
Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR). 
Monthly stock returns are related to yearly accounting data using various panel methodolo-
gies. Any model with monthly return data on the left hand side and yearly accounting data on 
the right hand side requires defining an appropriate matching criterion. In fact, it is a common 
approach in financial econometrics to regress return observations with a high frequency on 
explanatory variables with lower frequencies (e.g., see Daniel and Titman, 2006). However, 
this methodology requires correcting for potential biases that result from the persistence of the 
explanatory variables combined with a potential serial correlation of the dependent variable 
and/or the residuals (see section 4). In our main model, denoted as M3, we condition the 
monthly returns from April to June of year t+1 on annual report data of the previous year t. 
The lag of three months is chosen to avoid a possible look-ahead bias by ensuring that ac-
counting information is publicly known.7 In robustness tests, we also explore two alternative 
setups, using return data from April until September (M6) and December (M9), respectively. 
We do not test a model using a full twelve month period to avoid including returns that are 
likely to be influenced by expectations about the accounting data in the subsequent year t+2. 
2.2. Fundamental variables construction 
We use specific fundamental accounting variables in explaining the cross-section of expected 
bank stock returns in Europe. All variables except market capitalisation are designed as ratios. 
This eliminates currency effects and allows easier comparisons between banks.8 Using ratios 
deviates from the approach adopted by Cooper et al. (2003), who modify their raw data in 
                                                 
5 Decomposing the elements of either ROA or ROE using a value driver tree leads to the accounting factors that 
we use as dependent variables and are described in section 2.2 (e.g., see Koch and MacDonald, 2000). 
6 The total shareholder return index captures the theoretical growth based on price changes and dividend pay-
ments. Returns are calculated using Euro as the base currency. 
7 Several choices exist regarding the length of the publication lag, each being to some extent arbitrary. However, 
using a lag of three months seems consistent with the standard publication practices of European banks and also 
corresponds to the approach in previous studies (e.g., Wang et al., 2005). 
8 Clearly, comparability is limited by accounting policies such as conservative versus aggressive presentation of 
financial statements and other bank specific differences. 
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several ways. First, they have quarterly data available for US banks and calculate percentage 
changes of the ratios based on the average of the previous two quarters. Second, they express 
each independent variable in terms of its percentile rank in the cross-section of banks for any 
given month and scale it to lie between 0 and 1. Ordinary scaling is used to control for possi-
ble non-linearities and the effect of outliers and enables easy comparison across coefficients 
(e.g., Chan et al., 1996). Despite obvious advantages, this approach also has two major draw-
backs. First, after several transformations the information content of the original variables is 
reduced. Second, the interpretation of the relationship between the dependent variable (bank 
stock returns) and the independent variables (transformed ratios) becomes dubious. Contrary 
to Cooper et al. (2003), therefore, we use untransformed and unsmoothed accounting ratios as 
explanatory variables. Data constraints, however, are also an issue in our study. Cooper et al. 
(2003) condition bank stock returns on quarterly financial statements, whereas only annual 
accounting data are available in Europe (at least on a broad basis). Given the high data fre-
quency in their US panel, one could argue that changes of ratios contain the relevant informa-
tion, whereas the use of yearly accounting data makes the use of levels more feasible. The un-
derlying notion is that changes of ratios are priced by the market on a timely basis, while their 
levels also contain value relevant information, but with a slower dispersion. The main issue, 
therefore, is to what extent the information conveyed by accounting figures is consistent with 
that reflected in stock prices (e.g., Dumontier and Raffournier, 2002). 
We assume that bank performance depends on the strategic choice of a bank’s activities and 
its operational efficiency as well a risk management practices. Therefore, we construct seven 
bank-specific variables that contain fundamental (and supposedly value relevant) information: 
(1) book value of equity to total assets (EQ_TA), (2) loans to total assets (L_TA), (3) total 
earning assets to total non-earning assets (E_NEA), (4) loan loss provisions to net interest 
revenue (LLP_IR) (5) nominal value of off-balance sheet items to total assets (OB_TA), (6) 
non-interest income to total operating income (NI_TI) and (7) cost to income ratio (CIR). 
In addition to the bank-specific variables, we add control variables which have been used in 
previous asset pricing tests (e.g., Fama and French, 1992): (8) price earnings ratio (PE), (9) 
book value of equity to market value of equity (BM) and (10) market capitalisation (MCAP). 
Unlike all other factors, market capitalization is lagged by only one month instead of three 
months because this information is available to investors on a timely basis (i.e., we use market 
value figures from March, April, and May to condition bank returns). 
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(1) Book value of equity to total assets 
Their different leverage structure is one reason why banks have been ignored in earlier studies 
of stock return behaviour. We include a leverage variable, which is constructed as the ratio of 
the book value of common equity to total assets and labelled EQ_TA, to analyse if the capital 
structure contains information for bank stock returns. The equity-to-assets ratio measures the 
overall capital strength and supposedly captures the general safety and soundness of the bank. 
An increase in debt financing of the bank’s total assets (holding total assets constant) and/or a 
decline in its total assets (holding debt financing constant) will lead to a deterioration of the 
bank’s equity-to-assets ratio. In both cases, therefore, the bank’s risk increases, which in turn 
implies higher expected stock returns. In the standard textbook case, a higher use of debt (and 
a lower equity-to-assets ratio) will increase the firm’s cost of capital due to increased share-
holder return volatility. 
Leverage is important in explaining stock market performance of banks. For example, Brewer 
et al. (1996a, 1996b) document that leverage can explain financial institutions’ risk and return 
characteristics. The results in Cantor and Johnson (1992) suggest a positive relationship be-
tween improving capital ratios and stock market performance for bank holding companies. 
Among the methods to increase capital ratios, increases in earnings are associated with the 
largest stock price increases. However, these results are based on data from a time period 
when US banks in general were characterized by weak financial strength, presumably indicat-
ing that the market was evaluating capital ratios in the context of the prevailing risk situation. 
In contrast, Berger and Di Patti (2006) analyze data over the later period from 1990 to 1995 
and document that in their sample of US commercial banks higher leverage is positively re-
lated to profitability. They interpret this result as support for the existence of agency conflicts 
and the disciplining effect of debt. Finally, Sironi (1999) points out that substituting equity 
with less expensive sources of funds like subordinated debt is one way to decrease a bank’s 
cost of capital and to improve its overall profitability. 
(2) Loans to total assets 
Loans represent the major portion of the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet. We therefore use 
the ratio of net loans to total assets, denoted as L_TA, as an explanatory variable.9 While the 
nature of this ratio is complex, it is generally assumed that loans to total assets indicate the 
                                                 
9 Net loans are gross loans minus loan loss reserves. The loans positions also contain leases and mortgages. 
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future health of a bank, and it is often used as a proxy for measuring liquidity risk. Loans are 
difficult to trade in the secondary market, hence, they are the least liquid asset in the bank’s 
balance sheet (after fixed assets). A bank with a high ratio of loans to total assets is relatively 
illiquid, whereas a low ratio implies that the bank has some excess lending capacity. The ratio 
of loans to total assets, therefore, proxies for the utilisation of a bank’s balance sheet and may 
be an indicator for more or less profitable business models in terms of shareholder returns. 
Diamond (1984, 1991) and Fama (1985), among others, develop models in which banks col-
lect and process information about loan customers and continue to acquire private information 
through subsequent monitoring activities. However, the bank claims held by shareholders are 
unlikely to fully reflect the information impounded in the bank’s loan portfolio due to confi-
dentiality of the bank-borrower relationship and limited disclosure about lending agreements, 
implying that marking bank loans to the market is difficult (O’Hara, 1993; Slovin et al., 
1992). Private information forms the foundation for a loan portfolio and, therefore, the struc-
ture (and changes) of the loan-asset mix are difficult to interpret by outsiders. 
(3) Total earning assets to total non-earning assets 
The ratio of total earning assets to total non-earning assets, labelled E_NEA, is closely related 
to the ratio of loans to total assets, but it captures a broader range of activities on the asset side 
of a bank’s balance sheet. In addition to loans, earning assets include the various deposits due 
from other banks, discounts, as well as bond and equity securities held by the bank. In con-
trast, non-earning assets include required reserves held on deposits, cash balances needed for 
check clearing or other operational needs, and fixed assets. A high ratio of total earning assets 
to total non-earning assets may indicate a stronger focus on the core business, combined with 
a low percentage of assets that do not contribute to value generation. Presumably, a bank that 
has a substantial part of its assets tied up in non-earning assets faces a weaker competitive po-
sition. In this case, either the average return on total assets will be lower or the level of risk of 
the earning assets would have to be increased to compensate for the lack of cash flows from 
non-earning assets. 
(4) Loan-loss provisions to net interest revenue 
Thakor (1987) suggests that the level of loan-loss provisions is an indication of the bank’s as-
set quality and may signal changes in the future performance. We construct the ratio of loan-
loss provisions to net interest revenue, denoted as LLP_IR, and interpret is as a proxy for as-
set quality. Even if their portfolios exhibit a different level of risk, this ratio is comparable 
9 
across banks, because higher margins will compensate for higher exposure.10 If partial or full 
default of loans is expected, banks will react by making loan-loss provisions, thereby reduc-
ing earnings in the corresponding year. Higher loan-loss provisions increase the loan-loss re-
serve on the liability side of the balance sheet (as part of the bank’s equity), and loan-loss re-
serves decrease when loans are actually written off. Loan-loss provisions, therefore, are the 
traditional approach for banks to manage their credit risk, including the possibility to smooth 
earnings (Roger and Sinkey, 1999). In some instances, however, credit derivatives could be a 
superior substitute to loan-loss provisions (Moser, 1998). Therefore, a decrease in loan-loss 
provisions relative to interest revenue can be interpreted either as an indicator of improving 
quality of the bank’s loan portfolio and/or an increase in the use of more sophisticated risk 
management tools. In both cases, one would expect to observe a negative relationship be-
tween loan-loss provisions. Miller and Noulas (1997) suggest that declines in loan-loss provi-
sions are in many instances the primary catalyst for increases in profit margins. 
Although a bank’s management has significant discretion over timing and size of the changes 
in reserves, increases (decreases) in loan-loss reserves generally provide new information on 
the deterioration (improvement) of its loan portfolio. Strong and Meyer (1987) and Musumeci 
and Sinkey (1990) suggest that investors exploit information on loan-loss provisions to revise 
their performance expectations. Several studies document the impact of loan-loss reserves on 
bank stock returns. Grammatikos and Saunders (1990) find only a weak overall effect of loan-
loss provisions on bank stock returns, but Madura and Zarruk (1992) document a negative 
share price response when an increase in loan-loss reserves is related to bad real estate loans. 
Lancaster et al. (1993) and Docking et al. (1997) report a negative share price reaction upon 
announcement of an unexpected increase in loan-loss reserves. Wahlen (1994) examines the 
information content in non-performing loans, loan-loss provisions, and loan charge-offs and 
documents that all three components are important for explaining bank stock returns and fu-
ture cash flows. 
(5) Nominal value of off-balance sheet items to total assets 
With increasing competition in recent years, one of the most important developments in the 
banking sector is the surge in the volume of derivatives, options and structured products like 
                                                 
10 Because loan-loss provisions represent a flow variable and loan-loss reserves the corresponding stock variable, 
their information content is similar. Nevertheless, loan-loss provisions are more appropriate to capture the man-
agement’s current view about the risk exposure of their assets, while loan-loss reserves are assumed to represent 
accumulations from the past. 
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swaps, letters of credit, loan commitments, and credit default swaps. Although these instru-
ments are diverse, they all fall into the group of off-balance sheet activities, i.e., unlike tradi-
tional interest business they do not have a direct effect on the bank’s balance sheet. Therefore, 
an additional explanatory variable is the aggregate position of the notional amount of off-
balance sheet items divided by total assets, labelled OB_TA. For example, Casu and Girar-
done (2005) document that off-balance sheet activities measured by this ratio are important in 
explaining the productivity levels of European banks. Cooper et al. (2003) use unused loan 
commitments, standby letters of credit and interest rate swaps as distinct explanatory vari-
ables, but the data for such a detailed split are not available for European banks on a broader 
basis. 
Clearly, this definition has drawbacks. First, net exposure might differ substantially from the 
aggregate gross position. Second, it is unclear whether banks use off-balance sheet instru-
ments to hedge risk or to acquire additional risk exposure. For example, Avery and Berger 
(1991) argue that loan commitments increase a bank’s risk exposure by obligating it to issue 
future loans under terms that may no longer be acceptable. In contrast, however, Boot and 
Thakor (1991) suggest that loan commitments are incentives to constrain the risk-taking be-
haviour of a bank’s management. Using a sample of US banks, Brewer et al. (2000) document 
a positive relationship between a bank’s loan volume and its use of interest derivative instru-
ments, indicating that off-balance sheet activities tend to complement rather than substitute 
the traditional business. This result could also be interpreted as suggesting that off-balance 
sheet instruments are used as a hedge rather than to acquire additional risk exposure. For ex-
ample, Brewer and Koppenhaver (1992) observe that issuances of letters of credit affect the 
systematic risk and the total risk of bank stock returns, although less significantly than tradi-
tional balance sheet lending. Carter and Sinkey (1998) analyse a sample of US commercial 
banks and document a weakly positive relationship between the use of interest rate derivatives 
and interest rate risk. Most recently, the results in Wang et al. (2005) suggest that the disclo-
sure of the nominal value of off-balance sheet items of US banks is value relevant. The evi-
dence for incremental information content is even robust to the inclusion of fair value data. 
(6) Non-interest income to total operating income 
The changing banking landscape throughout Europe has led to an erosion of traditional in-
come sources. Many banks are rapidly expanding their range of business activities to maintain 
growth in revenues and to diversify away from their stagnating (or even declining) traditional 
11 
business. Therefore, activities that generate non-interest income are becoming increasingly 
important as indicators for the financial health of banks. We use the ratio of non-interest in-
come to total operating income, denoted as NI_TI, to asses the impact on bank stock returns.11 
This variable captures the nature of the revenue streams and the impact on the riskiness of fi-
nancial institutions. For example, the European Central Bank (2000) documents that the share 
of non-interest income to total income has increased from 30% to 41% between 1995 and 
1998, while it was below 20% in 1990. The composition of European banks’ non-interest in-
come is rather heterogeneous. In 1998, fees and commissions accounted for 54% of total non-
interest income, and profit from financial operations and income from securities made up 19% 
and 17%, respectively.12 Overall, the growth of non-interest income seems to have had a posi-
tive effect on bank profitability. 
While interest margins are highly dependent on interest-rate movements and economic cycles, 
fee income provides diversification and greater stability for bank profits. The diversification 
effect reduces the expected costs of financial distress and, therefore, presumably will have an 
impact on the valuation of banks. Grammatikos et al. (1986) document that US banks are able 
reduce their risk by engaging in off-balance sheet activities that generate non-interest income. 
Canals (1993) concludes that the revenues generated from new business units have signifi-
cantly contributed to improve bank performance. Saunders and Walter (1994) argue that the 
expansion of bank activities reduces risk, and the main risk reduction gains arise from insur-
ance rather than securities activities. Gallo et al. (1996) document that a high proportion of 
mutual fund assets managed relative to total assets of bank holding companies is associated 
with both increased profitability for bank holding companies and risk reduction. Similarly, 
Rogers and Sinkey (1999) observe that banks with a larger portion of new sources of income 
exhibit less risk because they can better diversify their income streams and have better access 
to the capital markets. The European Central Bank (2000) concludes that higher non-interest-
income relative to traditional income is not associated with an increase in bank stock return 
volatility. 
In contrast, DeYoung and Roland (2001) suggest that more non-interest income could be as-
sociated with higher levels of risk. They argue that traditional streams of income from inter-
                                                 
11 Clark and Siems (2002) use this variable as an alternative measure for off-balance sheet activities and docu-
ment that the ratios OB_TA and NI_TI are highly correlated. We therefore check for the possibility of multicol-
linearity of these variables in the empirical section. 
12 Figures are based on the year 1998; the remaining 10% consist of “other operating income”. 
12 
mediation activities are less volatile than income from fee-based activities and propose three 
explanations for their findings. First, in contrast to fee-based activities, most bank loans in 
continental Europe are relationship-based and associated with high switching cost (lock-in 
effect). Interest income from loans, therefore, may be less volatile than non-interest income, 
despite credit risk and interest rate risk. Second, the main input for an ongoing lending rela-
tionship is variable, while new fee-based products will generally trigger fixed expenses (e.g., 
labor expenses). Fee-based revenues, therefore, are associated with greater operating leverage 
than lending activities. Finally, most fee-based activities do not require banks to hold addi-
tional regulatory capital, leading to greater financial leverage than the traditional lending 
business. Both changes in operating and financial leverage supposedly induce additional vola-
tility in bank earnings. 
(7) Cost to income ratio 
Due to slower growth in revenues, cost efficiency has become a key strategic target for bank 
management in recent years. Many banks have introduced tremendous cost-saving efforts in-
cluding organizational changes (e.g., outsourcing), reduction in their branch network as well 
as the number of employees, and concentration on their core business. Next to the return on 
equity (ROE), the cost to income ratio is the most prominent benchmark measure in the bank-
ing industry. Therefore, we measure the operating efficiency by computing the cost to income 
ratio, labelled CIR, as the ratio of overhead costs to total operating income. 
Prior studies from the banking efficiency literature often use non-parametric modelling tech-
niques (e.g., see Beccalli et al., 2006).13 Nevertheless, several studies also document the rele-
vance of simple accounting ratios for bank profitability. For example, using US data, Vander 
Vennet (2002) observes that the cost to income ratio is important in explaining bank profit-
ability. Peristiani (1997) concludes that more complex efficiency measures are strongly corre-
lated with simple accounting ratios. Schure et al. (2004) examine differences between effi-
cient and inefficient European banks. In addition to generating higher profits, efficient banks 
are more often involved in off-balance sheet activities and fee generating activities than inef-
ficient banks. Their results also indicate that the cost to income ratio provides information 
about the underlying business portfolio. Banks that have successfully transformed their activi-
ties towards new income streams tend to display lower cost to income ratios than banks where 
the traditional business model still prevails. 
                                                 
13 Efficiency studies are mostly based on Data Envelopment Analysis or Stochastic Frontier Approaches. 
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(8) Price earnings ratio 
The price earning ratio (PE) is one of the key performance measures frequently observed by 
analysts and investors. Previous studies link changes in earnings to future stock returns. For 
example, a well documented phenomenon is the “post earnings announcement drift”, where 
stock prices underreact subsequent to earnings announcements (Ball and Brown, 1968; Ber-
nard and Thomas, 1990; Hew et al., 1996). Among other fundamental valuation ratios, Lakon-
ishok et al. (1994) as well as Fama and French (1998) classify stocks according to the price 
earnings ratio and document that stocks with low price earnings ratios (value stocks) outper-
form stocks with high price earnings ratios (growth stocks). To construct earnings per share, 
we use earnings that reflect profits after taxes, minority interest, and preferred dividends. The 
number of shares is based only on ordinary shares, except when preference shares participate 
in the profits, and stock prices in the nominator are year-end values. 
Earnings per share are not a measure that is unique to banks. However, as noted by Cooper et 
al. (2003), the fluctuation of banks’ earnings should be expected to be less severe over time 
than for non-financial firms because banks have some discretion in reporting their earnings 
(e.g., through adjusted loan-loss provisions). To some extent, therefore, banks should be able 
to insulate earnings against external shocks. If banks smooth their earnings, changes in earn-
ings per share will have an impact on future bank stock returns because they reveal inside in-
formation (signalling). 
3. Data description 
Most of our data are taken from the databases of Bureau van Dijk. In particular, financial ac-
counting data has been retrieved from Bankscope, and information on delisted firms and in-
dustry classification is from Osiris. Stock market data is from Datastream. We use yearly con-
solidated accounting data for a large sample of European banks from the financial statements 
contained in the Bankscope database over the time period from 1991 to 2005.14 In most in-
stances, Bankscope does not provide a single unique statement per bank over the entire sam-
ple period.15 Major changes in the accounting practices, e.g., the switch to consolidated finan-
cial statements, are accompanied by the introduction of a new separate time series for an en-
tity. Therefore, several different financial statements per entity may be available for a given 
reporting period, e.g., each representing a different basis of consolidation. This requires defin-
                                                 
14 Quarterly or half-year reports are only available for a few European banks over a very short period of time. 
15 See Micco et al. (2004) for a discussion about the use of Bankscope data. 
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ing rules for selecting and merging these statements to obtain one unique time series per bank 
entity. Our time series are constructed as follows: 
• The primary statement we use is labeled “Institution” by Bankscope, i.e., the most aggre-
gated statement as of year-end 2005. In general, this is a consolidated statement (C1, C2), 
and only in the few cases where a bank does not publish annual reports on a consolidated 
basis we use an unconsolidated version (U1).16 
• For the years before 2005, we choose the statement at the highest level available. If both 
consolidated and unconsolidated statements have been filed in a given year, the consoli-
dated statement is considered as the more aggregate version. 
• If in given year (e.g., during the early sample years) or over the entire sample period only 
unconsolidated statements are available, we assume that they represent the most senior in-
formation available. 
The underlying rationale for our classification is that if several statements exist for a bank in a 
given year, then the consolidated version incorporates all information necessary to model 
fundamental changes in bank value. In contrast, unconsolidated statements only track the per-
formance of the parent company and do not take into account the effects that subsidiaries have 
on the entity value.17 Once the most senior statement per year has been identified, the corre-
sponding time series are merged. The accounting data for the old and new reports overlap be-
cause firms are required to present a restatement for the previous year when a change to a new 
standard occurs. In this case, the figures from the old report are used rather than the restated 
figures from the following year. This procedure guarantees that no information is considered 
prior to publication and avoids a look-ahead bias. 
To be included in our sample, banks must be contained in the Bankscope database with loca-
tion in one of the 15 European countries forming the pre-2004 European Union, Switzerland 
or Norway. In addition, banks are required to be listed on a stock exchange or to have been 
delisted at some point in time during the sample period from 1991 to 2005. Accordingly, our 
                                                 
16 Bankscope has six codes for consolidation (C2, C1, C* and U2, U1, U*), where C indicates a consolidated and 
U denotes an unconsolidated statement. The extension “2” indicates that both a consolidated and an unconsoli-
dated statement exist for a bank (codes C2 and U2) at some point of time. Accordingly, the codes C1 and U1 
indicate that no companion statement exists. C* and U* indicate that additional statements have been filed. This 
leads to the following seniority ranking of statements filed (assuming that consolidated statements represent the 
most senior information available): C2/C1 > C* > U1 > U* > U2. 
17 See Abad et al. (2000) for a discussion of the value relevance of consolidated and unconsolidated accounting 
information. 
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sample is free from any survivorship biases. In addition, the corresponding monthly stock re-
turns must be available in the Datastream database. The full list of firms is broad and contains 
several types of entities that do not match the definition of a credit institution. The Bankscope 
classification is to some extent arbitrary, and therefore our sample contains all entities that are 
currently classified as “Banks” based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) pub-
lished by FTSE and Dow Jones. The ICB category “Banks” contains traditional commercial 
banks and universal banks, but it excludes specialized entities that are classified as “Invest-
ment Services” or “Asset Managers”. Based on this ICB sample of banks, entities are ex-
cluded if the fiscal-year end is not December 31 and/or the respective fiscal year covers less 
than twelve months. These steps result in a sample of 300 banks. The European banking in-
dustry is strongly dominated by the five countries where the major players are located: the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Switzerland and Italy. Table 1 reveals that the relevance 
of individual countries steeply declines from the top to the bottom of the ranking. Independent 
of the measure applied the top five countries make up two-thirds or more of the total of the 
respective item. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
In an additional step, our sample has been cleaned by applying the Bankscope independence 
index in combination with the Datastream item for the percentage of free float.18 Banks with a 
shareholder owning more than 50% of the outstanding shares (i.e., banks classified as C or D) 
and/or a free-float below 10% during the 2002-2005 period were dropped from the sample, 
reducing our initial sample from 300 to 265 banks. 
Finally, the accounting data have been cleaned for obvious outliers and data irregularities. In 
the first step, observations have been removed where negative values for data items are not 
sensible (e.g., common equity) or where items exceed logical bounds (e.g., if loans exceed 
total assets). In the second step, obvious outliers in the accounting ratios have been deleted 
(e.g., limiting the ratio of non-interest income to total income to lie in the range between 0 
and 1).19 To capture sufficient time series information, we further require that a bank has been 
in existence for at least 4 years. Our final sample contains 235 banks over the period from 
                                                 
18 The ratings of the independence index indicate ownership structures as follows: No recorded shareholder with 
ownership over 25% (A), no recorded shareholder with ownership over 50% (B), total (direct and indirect, e.g., 
via pyramiding) ownership over 50% (C), and total direct ownership over 50% (D). 
19 Extreme or implausible values have been deleted from our sample. In most instances, we only deleted the 1% 
outliers. However, because complete data on all items per observation are required, the number of firm-year ob-
servations reduces from 6610 to 6014, which corresponds to a reduction by roughly 9%. 
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1991 to 2005, with an average of 8 years of data per entity. By conditioning the returns over 3 
months on prior (yearly) accounting data (see section 2), our unbalanced panel contains over 
6000 firm-month observations.20 
Fama and French (1992, 1993) suggest that – in addition to the market portfolio – the market 
value of equity (as a proxy for firm size) and the ratio of book value of equity to market value 
of equity are sufficient to explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns. We therefore 
include both variables as controls in our regression analysis in addition to the bank-specific 
variables (see section 2). The book-to-market ratio (BM) is computed by dividing the book 
value of a bank’s equity by its market value (year-end values). Common equity corresponds 
to total shareholders’ equity less treasury stocks and components of preferred equity. Market 
capitalisation (MV) is the market price at the end of a year multiplied by the number of com-
mon shares outstanding. If several types of shares exist, we use aggregate values. The book-
to-market ratio is matched with stock returns in the same way as all other accounting vari-
ables. In contrast, assuming that the information is readily available to investors, we take mar-
ket capitalization in logarithmic form and allow for a time lag of only one month. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics, and table 3 displays the correlations between our ex-
planatory variables. The average monthly stock return (total return to shareholders, TRS) over 
the sample period is 1.5%, while the median is only 0.5%. Average stock market capitaliza-
tion amounts to €4.2 billions, and the average value of the price earnings ratio is 11.12. As 
could be expected, loans are the major asset components of banks, representing 62% of the 
balance sheet aggregates. This f is consistent with the high ratio of total earning assets to total 
non-earning assets (roughly 26 times). Loan-loss provisions amount to 20% of annual net in-
terest revenue. Non-interest income represents, on average, 33% of total operating income. 
The ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets is 26%, indicating that off-balance sheet 
penetration is lower in Europe (with the exception of the very large banks) than in the US. 
Finally, the equity to assets ratio and the cost-to-income ratio are 8% and 63%, respectively. 
[Insert tables 2 and 3 here] 
                                                 
20 Due to the nature of European banks, we do not work with more detailed subsamples of banks. The leading 
European banks are universal banks (e.g., Barclays, UBS, HSBC, Deutsche Bank), and the remaining entities are 
predominantly retail banks. Some specialized asset managers are based in the UK, but the majority of these enti-
ties are located in the United States. Another important segment in European banking is wealth management, but 
these banks are mostly not traded on stock exchanges. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Comparison of standard errors 
Cooper et al. (2003) base their empirical analysis on the cross-sectional time series methodol-
ogy developed by Fama and MacBeth (1973). The basic logic behind the Fama-MacBeth ap-
proach is to run T cross-sectional regressions for each time period in the sample and then cal-
culate the point estimates of coefficients as simple means over all T equations.21 Although 
this methodology is often applied in financial econometrics, current research emphasizes that 
it might be inappropriate in many instances. In the presence of a time effect (spatial depend-
ence), Fama-MacBeth produces unbiased standard errors and correctly sized confidence inter-
vals. Therefore, the Fama-MacBeth approach can be used if the observations for different en-
tities (firms) within the same period are correlated, but the observations for the same firm in 
different periods are uncorrelated. In contrast, if serial correlation is present in either the inde-
pendent variables or the residuals (or both), the Fama-MacBeth standard errors (SE) are bi-
ased in the same way as the ordinary least square (OLS) standard errors. Peterson (2006) 
shows that Fama-Macbeth standard errors are biased in the presence of firm effects. The mag-
nitude of the (downward) bias is a function of the serial correlation of both the independent 
variable and the residual within a cluster and the number of time periods per firm.22 
Given the structure of our data, we a priori suspect that there are both forms of dependencies. 
On the one hand, the dependent variable consists of monthly bank stock returns, which sup-
posedly exhibit (weak) serial correlation. Our independent (yearly) accounting variables will 
be persistent; in fact, serial correlation of these variables is large and dies away only slowly as 
the lag between observations increases. Moreover, we cannot rule out autocorrelation in the 
residuals. On the other hand, as only a single industry (banks) in the same geographic region 
(Europe) is analyzed, the yearly reporting figures are presumably affected by common shocks. 
Therefore, with both firm effects and time effects, we test several alternative panel estimators 
to identify possible biases in the standard errors. 
In a first step, we asses whether a fixed effects or a random effects model is appropriate using 
the Hausman (1978) specification test plus additional indicators provided by the regression 
output. Given that the Hausman test has very demanding assumptions, we implement the arti-
                                                 
21 T represents the number of corresponding time intervals in the sample. 
22 See also Ibragimov and Müller (2006). 
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ficial regression version of the test proposed by Wooldridge (2002).23 The results strongly 
suggest that the assumptions of a random effects model are not met by our data. Although the 
value of the Hausman test statistic decreases when adjusting for disturbances in the error 
terms, the rejection of the random effects model (as the null hypothesis) is always highly sig-
nificant. This result seems intuitive, because the selection of banks in our sample is assumed 
to represent a comprehensive description of the European banking industry rather than a ran-
domly drawn sample. 
In a second step, we test alternative corrections of standard errors in order to generate conser-
vative results. As suggested by Petersen (2006), table 4 compares the standard errors across 
estimation methods over the same fixed effects model. We do not report the corresponding 
point estimates because they are equal to those reported in model (1) in table 5 in section 4.2. 
Column (1) reports the robust standard errors calculated according to White (1980). Columns 
(2) and (3) contain clustered standard errors according to Roger (1993), which are White stan-
dard errors adjusted to account for possible correlation within a cluster. Column (4) displays 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, which are an extension of Newey and West’s 
(1987) non-parametric estimator.24 Robust standard errors are valid if only heteroscedasticity 
is present in the data. In contrast, standard errors with clusters either across companies (id) or 
years (yr) adjust for firm effects and time effects, respectively. Finally, Driscoll-Kraay stan-
dard errors are corrected for both firm effects and spatial dependence.25 An inspection of col-
umns (5) to (7) reveals that both the clustered and the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are up to 
two times larger in magnitude than the simple robust standard errors. We interpret this result 
as indicating that the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors should be used to derive conservative re-
sults. Finally, we also implement a test for spatial dependence using Pesaran’s (2004) test for 
cross-sectional dependence.26 As expected, time effects and/or cross-sectional dependence are 
detected in all model setups. 
[Insert table 4 here] 
                                                 
23 See Wooldridge (2002), p. 290. This version of the test uses robust or cluster corrected standard errors. 
24 Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors have been implemented in Stata by Hoechle (2006). 
25 See Höchle (2006), p. 4. 
26 See De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) for an implementation of Pesaran’s (2004) test in Stata. The null hypothe-
sis holds that the residuals are independent and identically distributed over time and across cross-sectional units. 
Under the alternative, the residuals may be correlated across cross-sections, but the assumption of no serial cor-
relation remains. The test statistic converges to a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis. The test 
values are above 80 in all cases, indicating that the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence can soundly 
be rejected at the 1% level. 
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In summary, both firm effects and time effects are present in our data, and the random effects 
model can be rejected based on the Hausman (1978) specification test. In our empirical analy-
sis, therefore, we use a fixed effects model combined with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard 
errors. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and spatial corre-
lation, thereby avoiding inflated t-statistics and producing conservative significance levels. 
4.2. Main empirical findings 
Our main findings are presented in table 5.27 Examining our baseline regression model with 
all ten explanatory variables in column (1) indicates that most of our explanatory variables are 
estimated significantly. The results are largely consistent with the theories introduced in sec-
tion 2. Moreover, the coefficient of determination of the fixed effects regressions (the within 
R²) is about 0.02, which is very low but in line with related predictability studies.28 
[Insert table 5 here] 
Looking at the explanatory variables in more detail, the coefficient on the ratio of loans to to-
tal assets (L_TA) is significantly positive. This finding indicates that a large loan portfolio is 
still value relevant, although the importance of lending activities in the overall bank portfolio 
is generally decreasing. It is also consistent with the notion that the variable L_TA proxies for 
the utilisation of a bank’s balance sheet, with a high ratio being an indicator for a more profit-
able business model. The positive (although insignificant) coefficient on the ratio of total 
earning assets to total non-earning assets (labelled E_NEA) has a similar interpretation, as 
both variables (L_TA and E_NEA) capture the activities on a bank’s asset side and measure 
the percentage of assets that contribute to value generation. 
As expected, the ratio of loan-loss provisions to net interest revenue (LLP_IR) is negatively 
related to bank stock returns. This ratio could be interpreted as a proxy for the ability of banks 
to balance risk and return, and increasing loan-loss reserves are presumably associated with a 
deteriorating quality of a bank’s loan portfolio and a subsequent decrease in profitability. 
Moreover, the positive impact of a higher ratio of non-interest income to total income (NI_TI) 
on bank stock returns documents that the market rewards banks that are less dependent on the 
traditional lending business. This observation supports the hypothesis that fee income pro-
vides diversification benefits for a bank and reduces its earnings volatility, thereby decreasing 
                                                 
27 To make the output easier to interpret, ratios are regressed on monthly returns expressed in percentage points. 
28 For example, see Dell’Aquila and Ronchetti (2006). 
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the expected costs of financial distress and the future cost of equity capital. The positive coef-
ficient on the ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets (OB_TA) further reinforces this 
notion. In fact, the results suggest that off-balance sheet activities create shareholder value 
rather than build up an uncompensated risk exposure. 
Consistent with the standard textbook case, the equity to assets ratio (EQ_TA) ratio exhibits a 
negative estimate, indicating that the stock market rewarded higher leverage with higher re-
turns. The corresponding coefficient is close to significance at the 10 percent level. To gain 
additional insight, it would be interesting to use the regulatory measures Tier 1 Ratio (T1R) 
and Total Capital Ratio (TCR) in our regressions, as defined by the Basle accord.29 In contrast 
to the equity to assets ratio, they represent risk-weighted measures. However, the data for the 
two ratios are not broadly available in the Bankscope database. Using available data, we com-
pute the correlation of EQ_TA with both risk weighted measures. The coefficients of correla-
tion between EQ_TA and T1R as well as TCR are 0.91 and 0.45, respectively. Overall, these 
findings seem to suggest that higher leverage translates into higher levels of ROE and ROA. 
Presumably, these ratios are closely followed by investors and, hence, a tight management of 
equity capital will be associated with superior bank performance.30 
The positive impact of the cost to income ratio (CIR) on bank stock returns is against the eco-
nomic intuition, suggesting that lower profitability translates into underperformance in terms 
of total shareholder returns. A possible explanation is that overhead costs in the numerator of 
the ratio may be distorted by different accounting policies with respect to the cost components 
included. A closer look at the data reveals that different groups of banks seem to have sys-
tematically lower cost to income ratios. However, any classification seems difficult because 
the ratios change significantly over time even for individual banks. Based on our findings an 
ad hoc hypothesis could be that banks that report a very low cost to income ratio do not pro-
vide a transparent view of their real cost structure. These banks obscure their real performance 
in the short run by discretionary calculation and, hence, market participants impose a penalty 
on banks with accounting practices that lead to unduly low cost to income ratios. 
                                                 
29 The Tier 1 Ratio consists of shareholders’ funds plus perpetual non-cumulative preference shares expressed as 
a percentage of risk weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks. The Total Capital Ratio consists of Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital expressed as percentage of risk weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks. Tier 2 capital includes 
subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves, and valuation reserves. 
30 Looking at the equity to total assets ratio of individual banks reveals that institutions like UBS, Svenska Han-
delsbanken, or Deutsche Bank all display values in the lowest ranges. Therefore, it seems that well managed and 
highly profitable banks fall into this group, further strengthening the evidence that our results are not spurious. 
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The coefficients on the non-banking control factors in our regressions are as expected. The 
coefficient on the price earnings ratio is positive, albeit insignificant. The coefficients on the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization (lnMCAP) and the book to market ratio (BM) indi-
cate that smaller banks outperform larger banks and value outperforms growth. Although the 
coefficient on the book to market ratio is insignificant, the results here together with the re-
sults for the robustness tests in table 6 to some extent confirm the findings in Barber and Lyon 
(1997) and Petkova (2006) that the standard fundamental factors maintain their explanatory 
power in a banking context. 
4.3. Robustness tests 
In this section, we report the results from several robustness tests. In a first step, in columns 
(2)-(5) of table 5 we test different specifications of our baseline regression model. Additional 
explanatory variables are included into the model according to their significance levels in the 
complete model in column (1). Our results are robust to the exclusion of the least significant 
explanatory variables and, hence, it can be assumed that no distorting cross relationships are 
present. As a minor change of the model setup, we replace the ratio of off-balance sheet assets 
to total assets (OB_TA) with the natural logarithm of the notional amount of off-balance sheet 
assets. In results not reported here, the point estimate becomes smaller but remains significant 
at the 5% level. 
In a second step, we divide the sample period into two subperiods, the first from 1991 to 1998 
and the second from 1999 to 2005. As shown in columns (1)-(3) in table 6, our results remain 
qualitatively robust, although the statistical significance is substantially lower in both subpe-
riods compared to the full sample period (possibly due to the lower number of observations). 
Although the Discroll and Kraay (1998) standard errors are used, we also include additional 
year dummies into the model to make sure our findings are not based on spurious spatial de-
pendencies. As reported in columns (4)-(6) in table 6, our results remain robust. 
[Insert table 6 here] 
We relate monthly bank stock returns to yearly accounting figures. In theory, therefore, a va-
riety of matching options exists, and it seems important to gain additional insights about the 
stability of our results when we use a longer return period. We assume a time lag of three 
months for the annual report to be published. In our baseline regression model, therefore, the 
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banks’ stock returns during the months April, May and June of year t+1 are conditioned on 
accounting data of the previous fiscal year t. Based on the regulatory requirements in which 
they operate, the banks in our sample have some discretion over their timing and will differ in 
their publication habits. In general, capital market oriented countries tend to encourage faster 
publication habits than bank-based countries. Another aspect, however, relates to the changes 
over time. Increasing performance pressure and corporate governance initiatives have led to a 
significant speeding up of the reporting process in most countries. As an example, upon re-
quest investor relations of Deutsche Bank provided detailed information on the publication 
dates of its annual report between 1993 and 2006. The publication date of the final report re-
mained unchanged during the period. However, the preliminary publication of the bank’s key 
figures gradually shifted forward by two months from end of March in 1993 to beginning of 
February in 2006. 
As another robustness check, in table 7 we report the results from several alternative models. 
The model in column (2), denoted as March-M3, conditions bank stock returns starting one 
month earlier compared to the baseline regression model (which is restated in column (1) for 
convenience), i.e., the model relates bank stock returns during the months March, April, and 
May of year t+1 to accounting numbers of year t. Compared to the baseline regression model, 
the model in column (3), labelled March-M4, also starts one month earlier but incorporates 
the four monthly returns from March to June of year t+1. The remaining two models, denoted 
as February-M3 and February-M4 in columns (4) and (5), respectively, are set up in the same 
way. 
Comparing the regression results in columns (1)-(5) in table 7, the ratio of loan-loss provi-
sions to net interest revenue (LLP_IR) and the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income (NI_TI) emerge as those factors that are stable over all alternative model specifica-
tions. Overall, while the significance levels remain high in the March-M3/M4 regression set-
ups, they drop sharply in the February-M3/M4 models. However, with only a few exceptions 
the signs of the estimated coefficients remain unchanged. 
[Insert table 7 here] 
The last two columns in table 7 contain yet two other possibilities to condition bank stock re-
turns. The model in column (6), denoted as M6, starts in April of year t+1, but uses the returns 
from the following 6 months and relates them with the accounting information from the pre-
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vious year t. The model in column (7), denoted as M9, uses the returns from the following 9 
months. We choose not to test a model with 12 monthly returns to avoid including returns that 
might be influenced by expectations or the actual publication of accounting data in year t+2. 
Intuitively, these specifications address the potential trade-off between capturing the full 
valuation effects of the information contained in our explanatory variables against including 
too much “noise” and/or stock returns that are already conditioned on a different information 
set. The results are very robust, but a closer inspection reveals that the magnitude of the esti-
mated coefficients tends to decrease if longer return periods are used. This finding indicates 
that the effect of fundamental banking data on stock returns is strongest close to the publica-
tion date of the annual report and then gradually fades out. A second observation is that the 
coefficient on the book-to-market ratio is now significant. Overall, we conclude that a three 
month publication lag in our baseline regression seems to be a reasonable choice that matches 
the publication habits and of the banks in our sample. 
Any regression model is prone to misspecification due to the effect of outliers. Although our 
sample has already been cleaned for unrealistic values in the data gathering process, as a final 
robustness test we now censor our explanatory variables to investigate whether our results are 
driven by extreme values. The results are shown in table 8, where column (1) again shows the 
results form our baseline regression model. Columns (2) and (3) contain the results when we 
censor the data at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Censoring the data leads to a loss in data 
points substantially exceeding the corresponding tail values, because for each firm-month ob-
servation complete data on all variables must be available. In fact, our full sample is sharply 
reduced by 12% in column (2) and even roughly cut in half in column (3). Nevertheless, al-
though the significance levels decrease with shrinking sample sizes, the results in table 8 indi-
cate that our findings are not driven by extreme value in the data. 
[Insert table 8 here] 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of individual bank fundamental variables on stock re-
turns using data from a sample of 235 listed and delisted European banks from 1991 to 2005. 
This is an interesting time period for the European banking industry because it marks a sig-
nificant transition period, characterized by an overall increase in competition throughout the 
sector, lower profit margins in the traditional interest-related business, and increasing non-
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interest income in terms of fees and commissions. We investigate the impact of traditional 
and non-traditional financial intermediation activities on banks’ profitability, as measured by 
stock returns subsequent to the release of relevant accounting figures. Our valuation model 
contains seven bank specific variables and three traditional asset pricing factors. The underly-
ing assumption is that the information contained in the fundamental variables predicts bank 
stock returns for a longer time span because of their close connection to the value creation 
process of a bank. 
We estimate panel regressions and implement different corrections for the standard errors to 
control for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and spatial correlation. Our results reveal that 
four bank-specific variables exhibit a robust explanatory power for bank stock returns across 
the different model specifications: 
- The ratio of loans to total assets has a positive impact on bank stock returns, indicating 
that capital markets still incorporate the classical side of business when they value banks; 
- the ratio of non-interest income to total income has a positive impact, implying that lower 
dependence on the traditional lending business is an indicator for banks’ financial health; 
- the ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets also has a positive impact, suggesting 
that banks create shareholder value when they engage in this fast growing business area; 
- the ratio of loan-loss provisions to net-interest income has a negative impact, confirming 
the notion that banks balance the level of risk relative to their cash flow generating assets; 
- the ratio of equity to total assets also has a negative impact, implying that tight capital 
management is necessary for banks because excessive equity cushion makes it hard to 
earn a competitive return on funds. 
Overall, the valuation of bank stocks incorporates both the classical loan-related side of bank-
ing activities and the growing off-balance activities. Moreover, both Fama-French asset pric-
ing factors, the book to market ratio and market capitalisation, are significant in several of our 
regression specification. This result confirms prior findings by Barber and Lyon (1997) that 
the standard fundamental factors maintain their explanatory power in a banking context, albeit 
significance is not strongly pronounced in our sample. 
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Table 1: The European banking universe 
 
 Country Total assets Equity Net Income Market Cap.  
 United Kingdom 21.2% 25.1% 26.5% 30.0%  
 Germany 16.2% 9.1% 2.1% 6.4%  
 France 14.9% 13.2% 12.2% 9.8%  
 Switzerland 10.1% 9.0% 18.7% 8.5%  
 Italy 8.3% 11.9% 7.0% 10.6%  
 Belgium 7.1% 5.9% 5.8% 5.0%  
 Spain 5.4% 7.7% 6.5% 9.5%  
 Netherlands 3.7% 5.5% 7.8% 6.2%  
 Sweden 3.2% 2.8% 3.4% 3.7%  
 Ireland 2.4% 2.0% 2.5% 2.5%  
 Austria 2.0% 2.0% 1.5% 1.6%  
 Denmark 1.7% 1.3% 1.6% 1.5%  
 Greece 1.1% 1.3% 1.1% 2.1%  
 Portugal 0.9% 1.2% 0.9% 0.9%  
 Luxembourg 0.8% 0.8% 0.6% 0.3%  
 Norway 0.8% 0.9% 1.4% 0.9%  
 Finland 0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 0.5%  
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  
This table provides a description of the European banking sector. The numbers indicate the percentages of the 
respective items combined from all banks in a particular country and are based on 2004 data from the Bankscope 
database. Countries are sorted by their share of total assets. 
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Table 2: Sample characteristics 
 
  Mean Std. dev. Q25 Median Q75  
 L_TA 0.620 0.166 0.521 0.622 0.739  
 E_NEA 26.689 18.384 12.577 21.081 33.896  
 LLP_IR 0.200 0.190 0.096 0.157 0.236  
 NI_TI 0.330 0.140 0.237 0.322 0.408  
 OB_TA 0.262 0.311 0.085 0.178 0.317  
 EQ_TA 0.079 0.039 0.052 0.068 0.098  
 CIR 0.630 0.117 0.560 0.626 0.696  
 PE 11.116 21.758 1.415 10.412 16.339  
 MCAP 4.165 12.313 0.062 0.244 1.679  
 BM 1.005 0.642 0.585 0.893 1.235  
 TRS 0.015 0.083 -0.023 0.005 0.043  
This table provides a data description based on 235 European banks over the period from 1991 to 2005 taken 
from the Bankscope database. The following bank-specific variables are used: L_TA denotes the ratio of loans to 
total assets, E_NEA the ratio of total earning assets to total non-earning assets, LLP_IR the ratio of loan loss 
provisions to net interest revenue, NI_TI the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income, OB_TA the 
ratio of the nominal value of off-balance sheet items to total assets, EQ_TA the ratio of book value of equity to 
total assets, and CIR the cost to income ratio. The asset pricing variables are as follows: PE is the price earnings 
ratio, MCAP the market capitalization (given in billions of Euro), and BM the ratio of book value of equity to 
market value of equity. TRS denotes the total return to shareholders on a monthly basis. The construction princi-
ples of the variables are described in section 2. Q 25 and Q75 are the 25% and 75% quintiles of the distribution, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: Correlation coefficients of explanatory variables 
 
 L_TA E_NEA LLP_IR NI_TI OB_TA EQ_TA CIR PE MCAP          BM 
  L_TA 1.000     
  E_NEA 0.308 1.000    
  LLP_IR 0.041 0.085 1.000   
  NI_TI -0.331 -0.315 0.016 1.000   
  OB_TA -0.161 -0.094 0.081 0.075 1.000   
  EQ_TA 0.102 0.115 -0.163 -0.209 0.098 1.000   
  CIR -0.279 -0.184 0.065 0.143 0.038 -0.220 1.000   
  PE -0.088 -0.082 -0.064 0.143 -0.054 -0.135 0.054 1.000  
  MCAP -0.242 -0.217 -0.064 0.321 0.014 -0.237 0.008 0.139 1.000 
  BM 0.260 0.148 0.105 -0.312 -0.079 0.181 0.043 -0.180 -0.262      1.000 
This table provides the matrix of correlation coefficients of the variables used to predict bank stock returns based 
on 235 European banks over the period from 1991 to 2005 taken from the Bankscope database. The following 
bank-specific variables are used: L_TA denotes the ratio of loans to total assets, E_NEA the ratio of total earning 
assets to total non-earning assets, LLP_IR the ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest revenue, NI_TI the ratio 
of non-interest income to total operating income, OB_TA the ratio of the nominal value of off-balance sheet 
items to total assets, EQ_TA the ratio of book value of equity to total assets, and CIR the cost to income ratio. 
The asset pricing variables are as follows: PE is the price earnings ratio, MCAP the market capitalization (given 
in billions of Euro), and BM the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. The construction princi-
ples of the variables are described in section 2. 
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Table 4: Comparison of standard errors of alternative panel regression estimators 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
   robust cluster(id) cluster(yr) D-K (2)÷(1) (3)÷(1) (4)÷(1)
 L_TA 1.92 1.66 2.75 2.78 0.87 1.43 1.45
 E_NEA 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.09 0.91 0.82
 LLP_IR 0.79 0.88 0.91 0.84 1.11 1.14 1.07
 NI_TI 1.57 1.67 2.15 2.03 1.06 1.37 1.30
 OB_TA 0.61 0.82 0.80 0.72 1.34 1.30 1.18
 EQ_TA 8.20 9.90 10.57 10.16 1.21 1.29 1.24
 CIR 1.90 1.74 2.27 1.91 0.92 1.19 1.01
 PE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00 1.13 1.00
 Ln(MCAP) 0.29 0.37 0.55 0.59 1.29 1.90 2.05
 BM 0.32 0.33 0.50 0.50 1.04 1.57 1.60
 C 3.77 4.87 6.89 8.00 1.29 1.83 2.13
This table compares the standard errors based on different estimators. The underlying model corresponds to the 
regression specification in column (1) in table 6 and, hence, the point estimates are the same in all columns. Col-
umn (1) reports robust standard errors based on the White (1980) variance-covariance matrix. Column (2) and 
(3) present the clustered standard errors based on Roger (1993), where clusters are across firms (id) and years 
(yr), respectively. The standard errors in column (4) are based on the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology, 
controlling for both firm effects and spatial dependence. Columns (5) to (7) present different ratios, where the 
robust standard errors from column (1) are in the denominator and the alternatives standard errors reported in 
column (2) to (4) are in the nominator. All variables are described in section 2, C denotes the intercept term. 
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Table 5: Main panel regression results 
 
            (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L_TA        9.308 5.787 9.407 9.307 8.878 8.864
            0.001 *** 0.065 * 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 ***
E_NEA       0.008                                                                            
            0.323                                                                            
LLP_IR      -4.068 -2.305 -3.537 -4.019 -3.634 -4.196
            0.000 *** 0.007 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
NI_TI       7.839 3.029 7.517 7.534 6.578 6.717
            0.000 *** 0.125 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.007 *** 0.005 ***
OB_TA       1.318                               1.372                1.421
            0.070 *                               0.059 *                0.060 *
EQ_TA       -16.525                               -15.905                -20.585
            0.105                               0.111                0.050 *
CIR         5.256 6.797 5.863 5.316                               
            0.006 *** 0.000 *** 0.003 *** 0.007 ***                               
PE          0.002                                                                            
            0.845                                                                            
ln(MCAP) -1.214                -1.338 -1.333 -1.406 -1.387
            0.041 **                0.020 ** 0.020 ** 0.013 ** 0.013 ***
BM          0.424                                                                            
            0.401                                                                            
C 6.025 -7.297 6.868 8.189 12.084 13.172
            0.452 0.008 *** 0.378 0.293 0.082 * 0.054 *
R2 (within) 0.020 0.009 0.018 0.020 0.015 0.018
N           6014 6014 6014 6014 6014 6014
# groups 235 235 235 235 235 235  
This table presents the results of our baseline regression model with different combinations of the explanatory 
variables. Monthly bank stock returns from April to June of year t+1 are conditioned on accounting data from 
year t. The bank-specific variables are: L_TA denotes the ratio of loans to total assets, E_NEA the ratio of total 
earning assets to total non-earning assets, LLP_IR the ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest revenue, NI_TI 
the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income, OB_TA the ratio of the nominal value of off-balance 
sheet items to total assets, EQ_TA the ratio of book value of equity to total assets, and CIR the cost to income 
ratio. The asset pricing variables are: PE is the price earnings ratio, MCAP the market capitalization (given in 
billions of Euro), and BM the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. C represents the regression 
constant. The construction principles of the variables are described in section 2. All regressions are specified as 
fixed effects models with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. The sample is based on 235 European 
banks over the period from 1991 to 2005 taken from the Bankscope database with 6014 firm-month observa-
tions. The figures underneath the estimate are the corresponding p-values. R² refers to the within estimator. Sig-
nificance levels are indicated by */**/*** on the 10%/5%/1% level. 
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Table 6: Panel regressions for sub-periods with optional year dummies 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1991-2005 1991 - 1998 1999 - 2005 1991-2005 1991 - 1998 1999 - 2005
            M3_base M3_I M3_II M3_yd M3_I_yd M3_II_yd
L_TA        9.308 2.903 10.554 3.198 -1.876 7.093
            0.001 *** 0.487 0.002 *** 0.080 * 0.595 0.000 ***
E_NEA       0.008 0.007 0.024 0.020 0.008 0.022
            0.323 0.571 0.103 0.011 ** 0.512 0.093
LLP_IR      -4.068 -3.500 -0.626 -2.641 -1.869 -1.400
            0.000 *** 0.012 ** 0.415 0.000 *** 0.068 * 0.090 *
NI_TI       7.839 4.317 2.686 5.544 2.051 6.993
            0.000 *** 0.143 0.488 0.001 *** 0.265 0.012 **
OB_TA       1.318 1.782 3.269 1.428 2.424 1.686
            0.070 * 0.161 0.075 * 0.022 ** 0.049 ** 0.278
EQ_TA       -16.525 -8.401 -37.349 -25.915 -20.112 -42.001
            0.105 0.518 0.059 * 0.009 *** 0.129 0.019 **
CIR         5.256 5.974 1.305 -1.069 -3.247 0.447
            0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.586 0.428 0.212 0.870
PE          0.002 0.026 -0.005 0.008 0.031 0.001
            0.845 0.114 0.296 0.334 0.079 * 0.839
ln(MCAP) -1.214 -0.654 -2.915 -2.878 -2.620 -5.079
            0.041 ** 0.352 0.106 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.024 **
BM          0.424 1.072 -0.518 -0.057 0.323 -1.483
            0.401 0.19 0.382 0.891 0.699 0.015 **
C 6.025 1.355 33.101 30.686 32.094 64.297
            0.452 0.878 0.155 0.000 *** 0.003 *** 0.035 **
R2 (within) 0.020 0.016 0.032 0.087 0.058 0.111
N           6014 2829 3185 6014 2829 3185
# groups 235 187 220 235 187 220  
This table presents the results of robustness tests. Column (1) shows the results from our baseline regression 
model, where monthly bank stock returns from April to June of year t+1 are conditioned on accounting data 
from year t (M3_base). The bank-specific variables are: L_TA denotes the ratio of loans to total assets, E_NEA 
the ratio of total earning assets to total non-earning assets, LLP_IR the ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest 
revenue, NI_TI the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income, OB_TA the ratio of the nominal value 
of off-balance sheet items to total assets, EQ_TA the ratio of book value of equity to total assets, and CIR the 
cost to income ratio. The asset pricing variables are: PE is the price earnings ratio, MCAP the market capitaliza-
tion (given in billions of Euro), and BM the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. C represents 
the regression constant. The construction principles of the variables are described in section 2. Columns (2) and 
(3) report the results from subperiods 1991-1998 (M3_I) and 1999-2005 (M3_II), respectively. All regressions 
are specified as fixed effects models with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. In columns (4) to (6) addi-
tional year dummies are used for the total sample period (M3_yd) as well as the two subperiods (M3_I_yd and 
M3_II_yd). The total sample is based on 235 European banks over the period from 1991 to 2005 taken from the 
Bankscope database with 6014 firm-month observations. The figures underneath the estimate are the correspond-
ing p-values. R² refers to the within estimator. Significance levels are indicated by */**/*** on the 10%/5%/1% 
level. 
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Table 7: Panel regressions with alternative timing specifications 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
            M3_base March M3 March M4 February M3 February M4 M6 M9
L_TA        9.308 5.116 6.425 1.349 3.424 5.004 4.084
            0.001 *** 0.061 * 0.012 ** 0.576 0.137 0.021 ** 0.018 **
E_NEA       0.008 0.011 0.008 0.016 0.010 0.003 0.001
            0.323 0.241 0.312 0.098 * 0.246 0.685 0.830
LLP_IR      -4.068 -4.102 -4.062 -3.875 -3.917 -2.534 -2.315
            0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.002 *** 0.000 *** 0.002 *** 0.000 ***
NI_TI       7.839 6.636 6.923 5.571 6.270 4.928 5.101
            0.000 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 0.017 ** 0.001 *** 0.029 ** 0.003 ***
OB_TA       1.318 1.493 1.129 0.590 0.99 0.218 0.411
            0.070 * 0.083 * 0.106 0.547 0.221 0.715 0.378
EQ_TA       -16.525 -10.888 -14.205 -10.235 -9.549 -13.59 -13.149
            0.105 0.256 0.087 * 0.269 0.276 0.051 * 0.019 **
CIR         5.256 3.288 3.498 0.868 1.237 2.508 2.896
            0.006 *** 0.094 * 0.032 ** 0.674 0.465 0.221 0.071 *
PE          0.002 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.001
            0.845 0.275 0.65 0.592 0.583 0.721 0.767
ln(MCAP)     -1.214 -1.029 -0.964 -0.738 -0.913 -0.648 -0.532
            0.041 ** 0.040 ** 0.055 * 0.152 0.047 ** 0.17 0.165
BM          0.424 0.447 0.203 0.277 0.397 1.039 0.846
            0.401 0.533 0.711 0.733 0.520 0.031 ** 0.012 **
C 6.025 7.456 6.098 8.344 8.555 2.908 2.130
            0.452 0.345 0.402 0.282 0.225 0.660 0.690
R2 (within) 0.020 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.006
N           6014 6020 8027 6024 8034 12016 17901
# groups 235 235 235 235 235 235 235  
This table presents the results of additional robustness tests. Column (1) shows the results from our baseline re-
gression model, where monthly bank stock returns from April to June of year t+1 are conditioned on accounting 
data from year t (M3_base). The bank-specific variables are: L_TA denotes the ratio of loans to total assets, 
E_NEA the ratio of total earning assets to total non-earning assets, LLP_IR the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net interest revenue, NI_TI the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income, OB_TA the ratio of the 
nominal value of off-balance sheet items to total assets, EQ_TA the ratio of book value of equity to total assets, 
and CIR the cost to income ratio. The asset pricing variables are: PE is the price earnings ratio, MCAP the mar-
ket capitalization (given in billions of Euro), and BM the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. 
C represents the regression constant. The construction principles of the variables are described in section 2. The 
model in column (2), denoted as March-M3, conditions bank stock returns starting one month earlier compared 
to the baseline regression model, i.e., the model relates bank stock returns during the months March, April, and 
May of year t+1 to accounting numbers of year t. The model in column (3), labelled March-M4, also starts one 
month earlier but incorporates the four monthly returns from March to June of year t+1. The remaining two 
models, denoted as February-M3 and February-M4 in columns (4) and (5), respectively, are set up in the same 
way. The model in column (6) starts in April of year t+1, but uses the returns from the following 6 months and 
relates them with the accounting information from the previous year t (M6). The model in column (7) uses the 
returns from the following 9 months (M9). All regressions are specified as fixed effects models with Driscoll and 
Kraay (1998) standard errors. The total sample is based on 235 European banks over the period from 1991 to 
2005 taken from the Bankscope database with 6014 firm-month observations. The figures underneath the esti-
mate are the corresponding p-values. R² refers to the within estimator. Significance levels are indicated by 
*/**/*** on the 10%/5%/1% level. 
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Table 8: Panel regressions with censored explanatory variables 
 
            (1) (2) (3)
            Base Censor_1% Censor_5%
L_TA        9.308 8.020 6.345
            0.001 *** 0.015 ** 0.061 *
E_NEA       0.008 -0.003 -0.006
            0.323 0.775 0.651
LLP_IR      -4.068 -3.856 -3.127
            0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.176
NI_TI       7.839 7.938 6.333
            0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.083 *
OB_TA       1.318 2.430 -0.689
            0.070 * 0.056 * 0.747
EQ_TA       -16.525 -14.426 -1.005
            0.105 0.116 0.928
CIR         5.256 5.318 8.308
            0.006 *** 0.056 * 0.067 *
PE          0.002 -0.002 -0.102
            0.845 0.957 0.010 ***
ln(MCAP)     -1.214 -0.777 0.426
            0.041 ** 0.152 0.478
BM          0.424 0.844 1.432
            0.401 0.171 0.255
C 6.025 0.634 -14.753
            0.452 0.935 0.095 *
R2 (within) 0.020 0.016 0.013
N           6014 5293 2993
# groups 235 224 172  
This table presents the results of additional robustness tests. Column (1) shows the results from our baseline re-
gression model, where monthly bank stock returns from April to June of year t+1 are conditioned on accounting 
data from year t (Base). The bank-specific variables are: L_TA denotes the ratio of loans to total assets, E_NEA 
the ratio of total earning assets to total non-earning assets, LLP_IR the ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest 
revenue, NI_TI the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income, OB_TA the ratio of the nominal value 
of off-balance sheet items to total assets, EQ_TA the ratio of book value of equity to total assets, and CIR the 
cost to income ratio. The asset pricing variables are: PE is the price earnings ratio, MCAP the market capitaliza-
tion (given in billions of Euro), and BM the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. C represents 
the regression constant. The construction principles of the variables are described in section 2. Columns (2) and 
(3) contain the results when we censor the data at the 1% (Censor_1%) and 5% (Censor_5%) level, respectively. 
All regressions are specified as fixed effects models with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. The total 
sample is based on 235 European banks over the period from 1991 to 2005 taken from the Bankscope database 
with 6014 firm-month observations. Censoring the data leads to a loss in data points substantially exceeding the 
corresponding tail values, because for each firm-month observation complete data on all variables must be avail-
able. The figures underneath the estimate are the corresponding p-values. R² refers to the within estimator. Sig-
nificance levels are indicated by */**/*** on the 10%/5%/1% level. 
 
